"Комплекс Льовенталя": що чекає нас і над чим починають задумуватися на Заході

Тиждень тому Микола Рябчук написав блискучу колонку під назвою "Комплекс Льовенталя": "У романі Кетрін Енн Портер "Корабель дурнів" є персонаж на прізвище Льовенталь – єврейський комерсант, котрий відмовляється еміґрувати з Німеччини, попри дедалі відчутнішу нацистську загрозу. "Це наша батьківщина, – каже він. – Зрештою, нас тут майже мільйон. Куди вони нас подінуть? Повбивають, чи що?"

Нещодавно я відбув подібну подорож із подібними персонажами – тільки не кораблем, а поїздом. Мої сусіди – освічені галичани – цілу дорогу переконували мене, що нічого страшного в Україні не сталося, що Табачник – це ще не вся Партія реґіонів, що є там персонажі й менш україножерчі, а головне – переживши Кучму, переживемо, мовляв, і його перевтілення у вигляді Януковича".

Переказувати далі не буду, матеріал є на сайті "Газети по-українськи". Але тиждень, що минув, показав, що загрозливі тенденції не послабились. Вчора стаття під красномовною назвою "Ukraine's Democracy in Danger" надрукована і у Wall Street Journal. Напередодні візиту до США Януковичу і його команді буде над чим подумати.

Український переклад з'явився на "Главреді". Англомовний оригінал тут:



Wall Street Journal Europe, March 30, 2010

Ukraine's Democracy in Danger

Viktor Yanukovych's misrule is courting a second 'Orange Revolution.'

By Alexander J. Motyl

As Ukraine's recently elected President Viktor Yanukovych prepares to

visit Washington in April, he will aim to project an image of stability,

confidence, and control. In reality, Mr. Yanukovych has committed a series

of mistakes that could doom his presidency, scare off foreign investors,

and thwart the country's modernization.

Mr. Yanukovych's first mistake was to violate the constitution by changing

the rules according to which ruling parliamentary coalitions are formed,

making it possible for his party to take the lead in partnership with

several others, including the Communists. That move immediately galvanized

the demoralized opposition that clustered around his challenger in the

presidential elections, former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.

His second mistake was to appoint as prime minister his crony Mykola

Azarov, a tough bureaucrat whose name is synonymous with government

corruption, ruinous taxation rates, and hostility to small business. The

appointment dispelled any hopes Ukrainians had that Mr. Yanukovych would

promote serious economic reform.

His third mistake was to agree to a cabinet consisting of 29 ministers as

opposed to 25 before-an impossibly large number that will only compound

its inability to engage in serious decision making. That the cabinet

contained not one woman-Mr. Azarov claimed that reform was not women's

work-only reinforced the image of the cabinet as a dysfunctional boys'

club.

His fourth mistake was to appoint two nonentities-a former state farm

manager, and an economics graduate from a Soviet agricultural institute-to

head the ministries of economy and finance. Meanwhile, he created a

Committee on Economic Reform, consisting of 24 members, to develop a

strategy of economic change. The size of the committee guarantees that it

will be a talk shop, while the incompetence of the two ministers means

that whatever genuinely positive ideas the Committee develops will remain

on paper.

His fifth mistake was to appoint the controversial Dmytro Tabachnik as

minister of education. Mr. Tabachnik has expressed chauvinist views that

democratically inclined Ukrainians regard as deeply offensive to their

national dignity, such as the belief that west Ukrainians are not real

Ukrainians; endorsing the sanitized view of Soviet history propagated by

the Kremlin; and claiming that Ukrainian language and culture flourished

in Soviet times. Unsurprisingly, many Ukrainians have reacted in the same

way that African Americans would react to KKK head David Duke's

appointment to such a position-with countrywide student strikes,

petitions, and demonstrations directed as much at Mr. Yanukovych as at Mr.

Tabachnik.

These five mistakes have effectively undermined Mr. Yanukovych's

legitimacy within a few weeks of his inauguration. The 45.5% of the

electorate that voted against him now feels vindicated; the 10-20% that

voted for him as the lesser of two evils now suspect that their fears of

Mrs. Tymoshenko's authoritarian tendencies were grossly exaggerated. And

everyone worries that Mr. Yanukovych and his band of Donbas-based "dons"

are ruthlessly pursuing the same anti-democratic agenda that sparked the

Orange Revolution of 2004.

Several other key dismissals and appointments have only reinforced this

view. The director of the Security Service archives-a conscientious

scholar who permitted unrestricted public access to documentation

revealing Soviet crimes-has been fired. The National Television and Radio

Company has been placed in the hands of a lightweight entertainer expected

to toe the line. Most disturbing perhaps, several of Mr. Yanukovych's

anti-democratically inclined party allies have been placed in charge of

provincial ministries of internal affairs-positions that give them broad

scope to clamp down on the liberties of ordinary citizens.

Democratically inclined Ukrainians are increasingly persuaded that Mr.

Yanukovych wants to become Ukraine's version of Belarus's dictator,

Alexander Lukashenko. But Mr. Yanukovych's vision of strong-man rule rests

on a strategic, and possibly fatal, misunderstanding of Ukraine.

First, the Orange Revolution and five years of Viktor Yushchenko's

presidency empowered the Ukrainian population, endowing it with a

self-confidence that it lacked before 2004 and consolidating a vigorous

civil society consisting of professionals, intellectuals, students, and

businesspeople with no fear of the powers that be. Mr. Yanukovych's

efforts to establish strong-man rule already are, and will continue to be,

resisted and ridiculed by the general population.

Second, Ukraine's shambolic government apparatus cannot serve as the basis

of an effective authoritarian government. Tough talk alone will fail to

whip a bloated bureaucracy into shape. Worse, Ukraine's security service

and army are a far cry from those in Belarus. Mr. Yanukovych may try to

emulate Mr. Lukashenko, but without a strong bureaucracy and coercive

apparatus, he will fail.

Third, with an ineffective cabinet, all decision making will be

concentrated in Mr. Yanukovych's hands. Even if one ignores his deficient

education and poor grasp of facts, Mr. Yanukovych's appointment of Mr.

Tabachnik demonstrates that Ukraine's president is either completely out

of touch with his own country, or arrogantly indifferent to public

opinion.

Fourth, Ukraine is still in the throes of a deep economic crisis. If Mr.

Yanukovych does nothing to fix the economy, Ukraine may soon face default,

and mass discontent among his working class constituency in the southeast

is likely. If Mr. Yanukovych does embark on serious reforms, that same

constituency will suffer and strikes are certain. So negotiating the

crisis will require popular legitimacy-which Mr. Yanukovych is rapidly

squandering; a strong government-which he does not have; and excellent

judgment-which is also missing from the equation.

Indeed, if Mr. Yanukovych keeps on making anti-democratic mistakes, he

could very well provoke a second Orange Revolution. But this time the

demonstrators would consist of democrats, students, and workers. The

prospect of growing instability will do little to attract foreign

investors, while declining legitimacy, growing incompetence, and tub

thumping will fail to modernize Ukraine's industry, agriculture, and

education. Mr. Yanukovych could very well be an even greater failure as

president than Mr. Yushchenko.

Although the outlook is grim, it is not yet hopeless for Ukraine's new

president. He could still grasp a modest victory from the jaws of an

embarrassing defeat by ruling as the president, not of Donetsk, but of all

Ukraine. All he has to do is restrain his appetite for power and learn to

rule with the opposition and with the population. It's not so

complicated-it's democracy.

Mr. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark.

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