Putin's 30-Year War and the New World Order
Europe's second "30-Year War" is ending, and the outcome is unclear. It is a catastrophe that could have been prevented if only...
It began even before Putin took office, when he and his "siloviki" – the displaced and embittered components of Russia's military, intelligence, and security services – envisioned the reconstruction of the country's czarist and soviet empires and its domination of Europe. The war, its planning and preparation, remained in a pre-kinetic phase until the offensive began in 2014. It continued as a war of attrition until 2022, when an estimated 3,000 tanks, 10,000 armored vehicles, and nearly 200,000 troops crossed the Ukrainian border to deal the final blow to a state that served as the primary obstacle to all of Putin's plans and ambitions. Four years later, instead of the widely anticipated three days, over 50% of Russia's military manpower and conventional military equipment lay littering Ukrainian fields.
Please make no mistake about it. The war was never about territory or resources alone. Russia, 28 times Ukraine's size, has enough of both. It is a war for domination of Europe and the displacement of a hated US-implemented and enforced World Order, in which individual freedom, democracy, government accountability, and sacrosanct borders are threatened, and the rule of law distinguishes Western civilization from regressive autocracies. It is a war in which the forceful inclusion and exploitation of Ukraine's resources and citizens into a murky "ruskiy mir" would both greatly strengthen Russia's attacks on Europe and expunge Ukrainian independence, sovereignty, and national identity for all time.
The invasion, from its earliest beginnings in 2014, was a clear breach of Russia's "guarantees", "affirmations," and "commitments" under the Budapest Memorandum regarding Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Ukrainians, who had relinquished the third largest nuclear arsenal in the world (still controlled by Russia and targeting the U.S.), for what they trusted were iron-clad guarantees from three signatory heads of states (U.S.,U.K., Russia), were shocked to learn that senior Obama officials had shrugged it off as not being binding on the U.S. [N.B. It should be noted that though the U.S. had signed the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1970, it had never been formally ratified by the Senate and is not legally binding on the U.S., thus leaving broad discretion in deciding which agreements signed by a president would be binding. However, in practice, agreements signed by the President are accorded great deference even without Senate ratification.]
To his credit, President Clinton, in the aftermath of Russia's 2022 invasion, recognized the Memorandum's importance and lawfully binding implications by acknowledging that he would not have signed it had he foreseen its consequences. President Biden's administration often cited the Memorandum and Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereignty in justifying the tens of billions of dollars needed to stave off Russia's invasion. In fact, the Biden White House maintained a page on its website about the Memorandum until it was removed by the Trump Administration. Even President Trump, in asserting that Russia would not have taken an inch of Ukrainian soil had he been president in 2014, can be understood to mean that timely U.S. intervention (as required by the Memorandum) could have persuaded Putin to back off. It was simply the Obama Administration that shrugged off the Memorandum and urged Ukrainians not to resist Putin for fear of escalation. The weak sanctions and the ban imposed on the sale of lethal weapons to Ukraine further encouraged Putin to proceed with his war plans.
Contrary to the Obama administration's dismissal of the (then inconvenient) Memorandum, Putin could not have imagined his stroke of good fortune when an American president failed to enforce an agreement by which Ukraine saved America from nuclear devastation while risking its own survival. But did the administration's senior officials consider the significant collateral damage they caused to the global rule of law, America's credibility, and nuclear non-proliferation while reassuring Ukrainians that the U.S. "had (their) back"? When the language of an agreement is so plain and its intent so clear as that of the Memorandum, sophistry is no substitute for substance, and equivocation as to its form and completeness is merely a smoke screen to evade responsibility. Although the Memorandum is only one page long, it is important to remember that 32 European nations rely on a single paragraph (Article 5) of the NATO charter that is one-third as long. America's failure to enforce the Memorandum led to the great ruination and insecurity of today.
Had the Memorandum been honored and the U.S. and U.K. stood firm when Putin first chose to violate it, there may have been alternatives to war, such as crippling sanctions, rapid military logistical support for Ukraine, a hold on Russian sovereign assets, a Ukrainian declaration of neutrality, and accession to NATO. Even the mere convening of a four-signatory conference (as required by the Memorandum) could have forced Russian withdrawal. The remedies could have been decided shortly after the breach and were well within the president's powers to invoke. Perhaps President Trump was right in saying that Putin could and should have been stopped in 2014. The Memorandum provided both an obligation and legitimacy to do so.
However, Ukraine cannot turn back the clock. It must face a future in which the Memorandum remains the baseline in its relations with the three global nuclear signatories, though enhanced by additional third-party security guarantees and a retaliatory capability sufficient to ensure that an aggressor would face assured and unacceptable consequences. As a baseline, it remains to be seen (when Ukraine is in a better negotiating position) whether the money Trump wants "returned" to the U.S. was a de facto loan or the cost of performing America's obligations. What is certain is that Ukraine did not give up its nuclear arsenal without the signatories recognizing that Ukraine expected (and was entitled to) something more than a pat on the back.
The 176 ICBMs and 6,000 warheads possessed by Ukraine (but controlled by Russia and targeted at the U.S.) could have reduced America to rubble. Ukraine removed the threat by deactivating or destroying that arsenal.
In addition, the U.S. and much of the world benefited from a secondary but equally important derivative effect. The Memorandum exposes Russia's duplicity and real intentions as a party to an agreement intended to reinforce the existing international order, but rips it to shreds shortly afterwards. The current "World Order" is the product of three-quarters of a century of progress by the U.S., Europe, and a majority of people and states to develop a global system of rules and laws that would ensure justice, security, accountability, and global cooperation. Notwithstanding the current U.S. Administration's failure to appreciate the extraordinary success and ennobling ideals encapsulated in the existing world order, the Budapest Memorandum inspired, directly or indirectly, the majority of nations to come to Ukraine's defense and, by extension, to preserve the existing order.
At the start of his 2022 invasion, Putin stated that one of his principal goals was to replace the "Anglo-American" world order with one of his own – a "new" order that would disassemble the current one and replace it (as the "new norm") with repressive, primitive, brutal regimes in which warlords, goons, and party loyalists treat other humans like disposables and without regard for their human dignity. This war has greatly eroded Putin's ability to do so.
Ukrainians must never again risk their security on diplomatic bait-and-switch tactics. As they say in America: "An agreement is only as good as the parties behind it."
This is the full author's version; an abridged version was published in the Kyiv Post on January 25, 2026: https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/68398
The views expressed in this opinion article are the author's and not necessarily those of Kyiv Post.
Col. Gen. Smeshko's academic credentials include a PhD in Technical Sciences and System Analysis, and a Master's of Law. After his first appointment as Ukraine's Defense Attaché to the United States, he held a variety of top-tier academic and leadership positions in governmental national security, law enforcement, and technical science agencies and committees, including that of Chairman of Ukraine's Joint Intelligence Committee, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine, Chairman of Ukraine's Security Service, and Acting Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. Smeshko is the author of "Essays on the History of Ukraine." He founded the "Center for Strategic Studies and Analysis," and ran as the presidential candidate from the Conservative-Democratic "Strength and Honor" party.
Блог автора – матеріал, який відображає винятково точку зору автора. Текст блогу не претендує на об'єктивність та всебічність висвітлення теми, яка у ньому піднімається. Редакція "Української правди" не відповідає за достовірність та тлумачення наведеної інформації і виконує винятково роль носія. Точка зору редакції УП може не збігатися з точкою зору автора блогу.
