Selecting the Prosecutor General in the Context of EU Integration: What Should the Procedure Look Like?
Recently, Yurydychna Gazeta (Legal Gazette) approached me with a request to clarify one of the points I made in my column. Below is an English translation of my response.
- In your column in Ukrainska Pravda, you write that, as part of its EU integration process, Ukraine has undertaken to establish a competitive procedure for selecting the Prosecutor General. Yet you then effectively propose a different model: consultations with international partners while retaining the existing appointment procedure. Is there not a contradiction here?
- First of all, I would like to note that the discussion about how the next Prosecutor General should be selected is now quite naturally linked to Ukraine's EU integration commitments. It is important, however, to distinguish between the objective of those commitments and the specific form in which that objective may be achieved.
I worked in the prosecution service for more than 25 years, and the situation today represents the most serious crisis I can recall. In my view, the crisis began in early 2020, when the first important changes were followed by a certain degree of regression. Since then, however, the situation has deteriorated further. A lack of trust, public scandals and confrontation with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and the Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO) are deepening the problem.
This is why the question of who should become the next Prosecutor General now extends far beyond a personnel appointment. The new head of the prosecution service must not only ensure its stable functioning, but also restore proper institutional cooperation, rebuild trust within the system and strengthen the ability of law enforcement bodies to work together without compromising their independence.
This brings us to the procedure itself. For several years, Ukraine's European partners have consistently emphasised the need to improve the process for selecting the Prosecutor General. Requirements concerning the appointment procedure have already been incorporated into specific documents forming part of Ukraine's EU integration process. The interim benchmarks for Chapter 23, Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, within the Fundamentals cluster identify, among the objectives, the need to enhance the transparency and merit-based nature of the procedures for the appointment and dismissal of the Prosecutor General and senior prosecutors.
The European Commission's 2025 Enlargement Package report on Ukraine formulates this requirement even more specifically: to reduce the risk of politicisation, the procedures for the selection and dismissal of the Prosecutor General should become more objective, transparent and merit-based, in line with European standards.
A joint statement by Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and the European Commissioner for Enlargement also identified the need for a comprehensive review of the procedure for selecting and dismissing the Prosecutor General and for bringing it into line with European best practices, with the involvement of the Venice Commission.
The Ministry of Justice, together with the European Union's Pravo-Justice III project and the European Commission, has now selected experts to conduct this review. Their terms of reference were agreed on 15 July 2026, and the final report is expected by the end of September. In other words, this is no longer simply a general political recommendation, but a concrete process for reviewing the existing model.
At the same time, none of these documents prescribes a single mandatory model of competitive selection for Ukraine. The European approach is primarily concerned with the quality of the procedure: it should be transparent, objective and merit-based, and should contain sufficient safeguards against politicisation.
This distinction is important. Different models for appointing prosecutors general exist across EU Member States. The Venice Commission likewise proceeds from the need to strike a balance between the democratic legitimacy of an appointment and the depoliticisation of the prosecution service. The involvement of the executive or legislative branches does not in itself contradict European standards. Such a system does, however, require additional safeguards to reduce the risk of political influence.
Therefore, in my view, the discussion about whether the procedure is formally called a "competition" should not overshadow the much more important questions of how the process will actually be conducted and what criteria will determine the decision.
There is another fundamental consideration today: the full-scale war. The procedure for appointing the Prosecutor General must take into account the conditions in which the state and the entire criminal justice system are operating. It must also take into account the fact that, under these circumstances, we cannot amend the Constitution, which provides that the Prosecutor General is appointed and dismissed by the President of Ukraine with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
Ukraine therefore needs a mechanism that, on the one hand, ensures a proper assessment of candidates and, on the other, does not turn the appointment of the head of one of the country's key criminal justice institutions into a lengthy process involving numerous formal stages. We need to move towards systemic changes without delay.
For this reason, an optimised selection format is entirely feasible for the current appointment. This could, for example, take the form of open consultations with candidates involving international partners, during which their professional experience, integrity, competence, managerial qualities and vision for the development of the prosecution service would be assessed. In substance, such a model would contain the key elements of competitive selection while being adapted to wartime conditions.
At the same time, streamlining the procedure must not mean lowering standards. On the contrary, the demands placed on the Prosecutor General during wartime are exceptionally high. The prosecution service handles an enormous volume of criminal cases, conducts public prosecutions before the courts, organises and provides procedural guidance for pre-trial investigations, and supervises covert and other investigative and search activities carried out by law enforcement bodies. It therefore plays one of the central roles in the criminal justice system. Professional competence, integrity and the ability to manage the system must consequently be subject to genuine rather than merely formal assessment.
This does not necessarily require the creation of a complex, multi-tiered structure. It is far more important to establish clear criteria in advance, ensure that the consultations are open, and allow the public to see who is seeking the position, what professional experience the candidates possess and what their vision is for the future of the prosecution service. The final decision should also be clear and properly reasoned.
Such an approach makes it possible to reconcile two needs that are not contradictory: taking account of the realities of wartime while fulfilling Ukraine's EU integration commitments. The purpose of those commitments is, above all, to ensure that the procedure is objective, transparent and focused on the professional merits of the candidate, rather than mechanically reproducing one particular model of competitive selection.
At the same time, the format used for the current appointment does not necessarily have to become the permanent model. For the next appointment of the Prosecutor General, a more comprehensive procedure could be introduced, with its stages, criteria and mechanisms for assessing candidates clearly defined in legislation.
For now, however, Ukraine needs to find a solution that responds both to the needs of a state at war and to its EU integration commitments. An optimised procedure does not mean abandoning the competitive approach. It means preserving its essential elements – professional selection, integrity assessment, transparency and a reasoned decision – without creating an excessively complex and lengthy mechanism in wartime.
Блог автора – матеріал, який відображає винятково точку зору автора. Текст блогу не претендує на об'єктивність та всебічність висвітлення теми, яка у ньому піднімається. Редакція "Української правди" не відповідає за достовірність та тлумачення наведеної інформації і виконує винятково роль носія. Точка зору редакції УП може не збігатися з точкою зору автора блогу.
